

LEVEL

TWENTY
SEVEN

C H A M B E R S



Quantum meruit claims following the High Court's
decision in
Mann v Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd


Sean Russell

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>> But first, some uncontroversial basics

- This decision only applies to termination by an innocent party following repudiation or fundamental breach
 - Gageler, [75]-[76]; Nettle, Gordon and Edelman [215]
- Termination following repudiation does not render the contract void *ab initio* but excuses future performance
 - *McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd* (1933) 48 CLR 457, 476-477, approved by everyone
- Where there is an accrued right to payment because there is a divisible obligation (or a divisible series of entire obligations), the remedy is contractual not restitutionary
 - Nettle, Gordon and Edelman [172]-[173]; Gageler [63]; Kiefel, Bell and Keane [19]
- Whether the obligation is entire or divisible is a question of construction
 - Nettle, Gordon and Edelman [175]-[176]; fn 236

>> Justifications for minority position



The basis is the
other party's
promise to perform

>> Nettle, Gordon and Edelman at [192]

	Nettle J Gordon J Edelman J	Nettle J Gordon J Edelman J
71.		72.
190	<p>Principle, coherence and authority dictate that the position in relation to a contract terminated by the innocent party where a contract is terminated for breach after the innocent party has partially completed the work for which the contract provides, the proper characterisation of the basis or condition on which the work was performed can only ever be the other party's promise to perform the contract (as opposed to the objective basis of the other party's performance of it), and, because the promise is enforceable by an action for damages, there is no failure of consideration²⁶⁸. The second is that,</p>	<p>other party's promise to perform the contract (as opposed to the objective basis of the other party's performance of it), and, because the promise is enforceable by an action for damages, there is no failure of consideration²⁶⁸. The second is that,</p>
191	<p>Admittedly, in the case of a contract terminated by the innocent party where a contract is terminated for breach after the innocent party has partially completed the work for which the contract provides, the proper characterisation of the basis or condition on which the work was performed can only ever be the other party's promise to perform the contract (as opposed to the objective basis of the other party's performance of it), and, because the promise is enforceable by an action for damages, there is no failure of consideration²⁶⁸. The second is that,</p>	<p>other party's promise to perform the contract (as opposed to the objective basis of the other party's performance of it), and, because the promise is enforceable by an action for damages, there is no failure of consideration²⁶⁸. The second is that,</p>
192	<p>Essentially, the arguments against retention of the alternative restitutionary remedy conduce to two principal propositions. The first is that, where a contract is terminated for breach after the innocent party has partially completed the work for which the contract provides, the proper characterisation of the basis or condition on which the work was performed can only ever be the other party's promise to perform the contract (as opposed to the objective basis of the other party's performance of it), and, because the promise is enforceable by an action for damages, there is no failure of consideration²⁶⁸. The second is that,</p>	<p>other party's promise to perform the contract (as opposed to the objective basis of the other party's performance of it), and, because the promise is enforceable by an action for damages, there is no failure of consideration²⁶⁸. The second is that,</p>
	<p>agreeing), quoting Birks, <i>An Introduction to the Law of Restitution</i> (1989) at 223. See [188] above.</p>	
	<p>266 See <i>Robinson v Harman</i> (1848) 1 Ex 850 at 855 per Parke B [154 ER 363 at 365]; <i>Livingstone v Ravyards Coal Company</i> (1880) 5 App Cas 25 at 39 per Lord Blackburn, <i>Wenham v Ella</i> (1972) 127 CLR 454 at 471 per Gibbs J, [1972] HCA 43; <i>The Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd</i> (1991) 174 CLR 64 at 80-82 per Mason CJ and Dawson J, 98 per Brennan J, 116-117 per Deane J, 134 per Toohy J, 148 per Gaudron J, 161 per McHugh J, [1991] HCA 54.</p>	
	<p>267 See Hunter and Carter, "Quantum Meruit and Building Contracts" (1989) 2 <i>Journal of Contract Law</i> 95 at 113; Stewart and Carter, "Frustrated Contracts and Statutory Adjustment: The Case for a Reappraisal" (1992) 51 <i>Cambridge Law Journal</i> 66.</p>	
		<p>in English law, an enforceable contract may be formed by an exchange of a promise for a promise, or by the exchange of a promise for an act – I am excluding contracts under seal – and thus, in the law relating to the formation of contract the promise to do a thing may often be the consideration, but when one is considering the law of failure of consideration and of the quasi-contractual right to recover money on that</p>
		<p>268 See, eg, McLure, "Failure of Consideration and the Boundaries of Restitution and Contract", in Degeling and Edelman (eds), <i>Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law</i> (2008) 209 at 211-215; Raghavan, "Failure of Consideration as a Basis for Quantum Meruit following a Repudiatory Breach of Contract" (2016) 42 <i>Monash University Law Review</i> 179 at 186-187, 197.</p>
		<p>269 See, eg, Beatson, "The Temptation of Elegance: Concurrence of Restitutionary and Contractual Claims", in Swadling and Jones (eds), <i>The Search for Principle: Essays in Honour of Lord Goff of Chelmsley</i> (1999) 143 at 151-152; Jaffey, "Restitutionary Remedies in the Contractual Context" (2013) 76 <i>Modern Law Review</i> 429 at 440-441; Havelock, "A Taxonomic Approach to Quantum Meruit" (2016) 132 <i>Law Quarterly Review</i> 470 at 481.</p>
		<p>270 See <i>Fibrosa</i> [1943] AC 32 at 48-49 per Viscount Simon LC, 72 per Lord Wright, cf at 53 per Lord Atkin, 56 per Lord Russell of Killowen, 82 per Lord Porter, <i>David Securities</i> (1992) 175 CLR 353 at 382 per Mason CJ, Deane, Toohy, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; <i>Baltic Shipping</i> (1993) 176 CLR 344 at 350-351 per Mason CJ (Brennan and Toohy JJ agreeing at 367, 383), 376 per Deane and Dawson JJ, 389 per McHugh J. See also Havelock, "A Taxonomic Approach to Quantum Meruit" (2016) 132 <i>Law Quarterly Review</i> 470 at 490-492.</p>
		<p>271 [1943] AC 32 at 48.</p>

>> Justifications for minority position


The basis is the other party's promise to perform

There is no need for restitution; damages are adequate


>> Nettle, Gordon and Edelman at [192]

	Nettle J Gordon J Edelman J	Nettle J Gordon J Edelman J
71.		72.
190	<p>Principle, coherence and authority dictate that the position in relation to a contract terminated by the innocent party is that the innocent party is to be put in the position in which he or she would have been if the contract had been performed. Although it may seem thoughtless to say so, the innocent party is not to be put in the position in which he or she would have been if the contract had been performed. The innocent party is to be put in the position in which he or she would have been if the contract had been performed. The innocent party is to be put in the position in which he or she would have been if the contract had been performed.</p>	<p>other party's promise to perform the contract (as opposed to the objective basis of the contract). The innocent party is to be put in the position in which he or she would have been if the contract had been performed. The innocent party is to be put in the position in which he or she would have been if the contract had been performed.</p>
191	<p>Admittedly, the innocent party is to be put in the position in which he or she would have been if the contract had been performed. On that basis, it has been contended that what applies to frustration cannot or should not be transposed to termination for breach²⁶⁸. There is also a great deal of academic writing which is similarly critical of the existence of a non-contractual remedy upon termination.</p>	<p>second is that, work has been done up to the avoided the contractual obligations (as opposed to being limited to that party's promise to perform them), the other party's failure to perform them yields a contractual remedy which is appropriate and adequate to put the innocent party in the position in which he or she would have been if the contract had been performed; and, therefore, there is no need or justification for the imposition of an alternative restitutionary remedy²⁶⁹.</p>
192	<p>Essentially, the arguments against retention of the alternative restitutionary remedy conduce to two principal propositions. The first is that, where a contract is terminated for breach after the innocent party has partially completed the work for which the contract provides, the proper characterisation of the basis or condition on which the work was performed can only ever be the</p>	<p>formation of contract, the promise to do a thing may often be the consideration, but when one is considering the law of failure of consideration and of the quasi-contractual right to recover money on that</p>
	<p>agreeing), quoting Birks, <i>An Introduction to the Law of Restitution</i> (1989) at 223. See [188] above.</p>	<p>268 See, eg, McLure, "Failure of Consideration and the Boundaries of Restitution and Contract", in Degeling and Edelman (eds), <i>Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law</i> (2008) 209 at 211-215; Raghavan, "Failure of Consideration as a Basis for Quantum Meruit following a Repudiatory Breach of Contract" (2016) 42 <i>Monash University Law Review</i> 179 at 186-187, 197.</p>
266	<p>See <i>Robinson v Harman</i> (1848) 1 Ex 850 at 855 per Parke B [154 ER 363 at 365]; <i>Livingstone v Ravyards Coal Company</i> (1880) 5 App Cas 25 at 39 per Lord Blackburn, <i>Wenham v Ella</i> (1972) 127 CLR 454 at 471 per Gibbs J, [1972] HCA 43; <i>The Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd</i> (1991) 174 CLR 64 at 80-82 per Mason CJ and Dawson J, 98 per Brennan J, 116-117 per Deane J, 134 per Toohy J, 148 per Gaudron J, 161 per McHugh J, [1991] HCA 54.</p>	<p>269 See, eg, Beatson, "The Temptation of Elegance: Concurrence of Restitutionary and Contractual Claims", in Swadling and Jones (eds), <i>The Search for Principle: Essays in Honour of Lord Goff of Chiveley</i> (1999) 143 at 151-152; Jaffey, "Restitutionary Remedies in the Contractual Context" (2013) 76 <i>Modern Law Review</i> 429 at 440-441; Havelock, "A Taxonomic Approach to Quantum Meruit" (2016) 132 <i>Law Quarterly Review</i> 470 at 481.</p>
267	<p>See Hunter and Carter, "Quantum Meruit and Building Contracts" (1989) 2 <i>Journal of Contract Law</i> 95 at 113; Stewart and Carter, "Frustrated Contracts and Statutory Adjustment: The Case for a Reappraisal" (1992) 51 <i>Cambridge Law Journal</i> 66.</p>	<p>270 See <i>Fibrosa</i> [1943] AC 32 at 48-49 per Viscount Simon LC, 72 per Lord Wright, cf at 53 per Lord Atkin, 56 per Lord Russell of Killowen, 82 per Lord Porter; <i>David Securities</i> (1992) 175 CLR 353 at 382 per Mason CJ, Deane, Toohy, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; <i>Baltic Shipping</i> (1993) 176 CLR 344 at 350-351 per Mason CJ (Brennan and Toohy JJ agreeing at 367, 383), 376 per Deane and Dawson JJ, 389 per McHugh J. See also Havelock, "A Taxonomic Approach to Quantum Meruit" (2016) 132 <i>Law Quarterly Review</i> 470 at 490-492.</p>
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
>> Justifications for minority position



The basis is the other party's promise to perform



There is no need for restitution; damages are adequate



The parties have contractually allocated risk

>> So, what went wrong?

The basis is the other party's promise to perform

- Contrary to authority
- Premised on a misconception
- Nettle, Gordon and Edelman at [193]-[194]

There is no need for restitution, damages are adequate

- More to commend it, BUT
- Practical value in liquidated demand and more straightforward proof
- Common law system is messy
- Nettle, Gordon and Edelman at [198]-[199]
- Gageler at [84], [86]-[88]

The parties have contractually allocated risk

- Artificial and wrong in principle
- Gageler at [83]